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Abstract 
While China is on track to meet its global climate commitments through 2020, China’s post-2020 CO2 
emissions trajectory is highly uncertain, with projections varying widely across studies. Over the past 
year, the Chinese government has announced new policy directives to deepen economic reform, 
protect the environment, and limit fossil energy use in China. To evaluate how new policy directives 
could affect energy and climate change outcomes, we simulate two levels of policy effort—a 
Continued Effort scenario that extends current policies beyond 2020 and an Accelerated Effort 
scenario that reflects newly announced policies—on the evolution of China’s energy and economic 
system over the next several decades. Importantly, we find that both levels of policy effort would bend 
down the CO2 emissions trajectory before 2050 without undermining economic development, 
although coal use and CO2 emissions peak about 10 years earlier in the Accelerated Effort scenario. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent shifts in internal policy suggest that China’s policymakers are serious about 
transforming the country’s energy system in ways that will reduce both energy-related CO2 
emissions and air pollution faster than previously expected. The Third Plenum of the Eighteenth 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in November 2013 in Beijing, established major 
new directions for reforming China’s economic, political, and social system. Environmental 
protection took center stage at the Plenum as policymakers pledged to support slower but more 
sustainable economic growth, market-based approaches to pollution control, and new efforts to 
build an “ecological civilization” (China Daily, 2013a). To support these objectives, specific 
actions announced at the Plenum included liberalizing energy prices, taxing energy-intensive and 
highly polluting industries, and developing taxes or quotas to control emissions of CO2 and other 
pollutants. The newly announced National Air Pollution Action Plan aims to reduce the share of 
coal in primary energy below 65% by 2017 by implementing higher resource taxes or caps on 
coal use (MEP, 2013). Delivered with an unprecedented sense of urgency and importance, the 
Chinese government’s very recent energy and environmental policy announcements necessitate 
new analysis to understand their impact on China’s energy system and CO2 emissions trajectory.  
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More aggressive action at home will inform China’s domestic and international commitments to 
mitigate climate change. At the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, China made a commitment to 
reduce the carbon intensity (CO2 emission divided by GDP) by 40–45% in 2020, relative to 2005 
levels, and to have at least 15% of primary energy produced from non-fossil energy sources by 
2020 (non-fossil electricity is converted to primary energy equivalent using the average efficiency 
of a coal-fired power plant in China). China achieved a CO2 intensity reduction of 21% over the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2005–2010), and targets a further reduction of 17% over the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). If China can achieve a carbon intensity reduction of 3% per year 
during the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), it will accomplish a carbon intensity reduction 
of approximately 44% from 2005 to 2020, well within the range of its Copenhagen CO2 intensity 
reduction pledge. While China is on track to meet its Copenhagen targets (China Daily, 2013b), 
China’s CO2 emissions trajectory after 2020 is highly uncertain. Model projections of CO2 
emissions vary significantly, and are sensitive to assumptions about future economic growth, 
technology cost, and climate policy (Calvin et al., 2012; Paltsev et al., 2012). 
2. SCENARIO ANALYSIS  
To understand the sustained impact of the new measures proposed above on China’s 
economy, energy system, and CO2 emissions, we simulate two scenarios that represent different 
levels of policy effort using the China-in-Global Energy Model (C-GEM) (Qi et al., 2014a) and 
compare them to a counterfactual (No Policy) scenario. The scenarios are described in Table 1. 
First, we model a Continued Effort (CE) scenario that maintains the pace set by China’s existing 
CO2 intensity reduction targets through 2050. Importantly, we find the current rate of reduction 
cannot be sustained by efficiency improvements that would naturally result from the turnover of 
capital equipment and baseline rates of technological progress adopted in our No Policy scenario. 
To maintain a CO2 intensity reduction rate of approximately 3% per year (corresponding to an 
extension of the targeted reduction pace for the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, 2016–2020), a carbon 
tax is introduced. The CE scenario also includes existing resource taxes (taxes on crude oil and 
natural gas at 5% of the base price, and a tax on coal of 4 CNY per ton).  
The Accelerated Effort (AE) scenario includes additional policies consistent with government 
announcements made recently (in late 2013 and early 2014), including the National Air Pollution 
Action Plan and commitments to continue economic reform, accelerate deployment of solar and 
nuclear electricity, and develop environmental pollution markets. In the AE scenario, we model a 
carbon tax consistent with a more aggressive CO2 reduction scenario (4% per year), in addition 
to higher resource taxes (ad valorem taxes on crude oil and natural gas at 8% and coal at 10%) 
(Natural Gas Daily, 2013).  
Both scenarios include variants of existing policies to promote low carbon energy. Consistent 
with existing renewable electricity policy, both the CE and AE scenarios include a feed-in tariff 
(FIT) for wind, solar, and biomass electricity that is funded by a surcharge on the price of 
electricity. Surcharges are endogenously set to match current FIT levels (described in the 
Appendix). In both the CE and AE scenarios, nuclear targets of 40 GW by 2015 and 58 GW by 
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2020 are achieved. The AE scenario reflects a more aggressive assumption about deployment 
beyond 2020, relative to the CE scenario. We model nuclear power deployment rates as limited 
by government plans rather than technology cost, given that approvals and expansion are 
expected to closely follow state directives and nuclear electricity is currently cost competitive 
with existing conventional (coal) generation. 
Table 1. Policy assumptions in each scenario. 
Measures No Policy Continued Effort Accelerated Effort 
Carbon tax No carbon tax 
Carbon tax required to achieve CI 
reduction (~3% per year, $26/ton 
in 2030 and $58/ton in 2050) 
Carbon tax rises to achieve CI 
reduction (~4% per year, $38/ton 
in 2030 and $115/ton in 2050) 
Fossil resource tax No fossil resource tax Crude oil/natural gas: price + 5% Coal: 4 CNY/ton (~$0.6/ton) 
Crude oil/natural gas: price + 8% 
Coal: 10% of the price 
Feed-in tariff (FIT) 
for wind, solar and 
biomass electricity 
No FIT Surcharge is applied to electricity prices to finance FIT 
Surcharge is applied to electricity 
prices to finance FIT; scaling 
costs are lower than Continued 
Effort assumption 
Hydro resource 
development 
Only economically 
viable hydro resources 
are deployed with no 
policy constraint 
Achieve the existing target of 350 
GW in 2020 and slowly increase 
to 400 GW by 2050 
Same as the Continued Effort 
assumption 
Nuclear power 
development policy 
No targets or measures 
to promote nuclear 
energy development 
Achieves the existing target of 
58 GW in 2020 and increases to 
350 GW by 2050 
Same as the Continued Effort 
assumption in 2020 and 
increases to 450 GW by 2050 
We compare the CE and AE scenarios to a No Policy (NP) (counterfactual) scenario that 
assumes no energy or climate policies are implemented from 2010 onwards. All scenarios 
assume a gradually declining savings rate in China as the economy develops, consistent with 
historically observed trajectories for advanced economies and with the stated objectives of 
China’s government policy. Scenarios also assume modest levels of ongoing energy efficiency 
improvement resulting from turnover and equipment upgrading over time (details and sensitivity 
analysis can be found in the Appendix in Sections A2, A3 and A4). In all scenarios, we assume 
that energy prices are determined by the market in future periods, representing a retreat from 
remaining controls on energy prices, specifically, prices for natural gas, gasoline, diesel, and 
electricity. 
Total primary energy trajectories for the three scenarios, and the composition by energy type 
for the AE scenario, are all shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the corresponding CO2 emissions 
trajectories. In the No Policy scenario, we find that while CO2 emissions intensity continues to 
fall modestly, total emissions continue to rise through 2050. Rising CO2 emissions are mainly 
due to continued reliance on China’s domestic coal resources. While we do not explicitly assess 
economic damages due to either pollution or climate change, this level of coal use is widely 
recognized in China’s policy circles as untenable without aggressive deployment of carbon 
capture and storage as well as pollution removal technology. 
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Figure 1. Energy demand in the No Policy, Continued Effort, and Accelerated Effort scenarios, with the 
primary energy mix shown for the Accelerated Effort scenario. 
 
Figure 2. Total CO2 emissions in China in the No Policy, Continued Effort, and Accelerated Effort 
scenarios. 
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Turning to the Continued Effort scenario, we find that if China’s policymakers implement a 
CO2 charge at the level needed to reduce CO2 intensity by 3% per year beyond 2020 and 
incentivize an increase in the non-fossil share of primary energy, CO2 emissions level off at 
around 12 bmt in the 2035 to 2045 time frame. The CO2 charge that supports this goal reaches 
$26/ton CO2 in 2030 and $58/ton CO2 in 2050. Deployment of non-fossil energy is significant, 
with the share of non-fossil energy climbing from 15% in 2020 to around 26% through 2050. 
The oil share in total primary energy demand rises from 18% in 2010 to 21% in 2050 (17 EJ to 
45 EJ), while coal continues to account for a significant share of primary energy demand (39% in 
2050 or 85 EJ). Natural gas rises to 14% of total demand in 2050 (30 EJ). Nuclear power 
expands significantly to around 11% of total primary energy in 2050 (24 EJ).  
The Accelerated Effort scenario simulates the impact of more aggressive measures relative to 
the CE scenario, including a higher CO2 charge and a higher resource tax on coal. Under these 
assumptions, we find that carbon emissions level off in the 2025 to 2035 time frame at around 
10 bmt. The carbon tax rises from $38/ton CO2 in 2030 to $115/ton CO2 in 2050, as low cost 
CO2 reduction opportunities are exhausted and deeper reductions become ever more expensive to 
achieve.  
Policies in the AE scenario result in significant deployment of non-fossil energy (which 
accounts for 39% of the primary energy mix by 2050), while natural gas plays a less important 
role relative to the existing effort scenario, approaching only 12% of the energy mix by 2050. 
Natural gas growth declines eventually because it is not carbon free, and is penalized by the CO2 
price. Oil as a share of primary energy use increases from 18% in 2010 to 21% in 2050, even as 
demand growth levels off by 2050 at about 40 EJ. The oil demand projection reflects the 
combined effect of ongoing improvements in technical efficiency across all transport modes, an 
increase in household demand for private vehicle ownership and travel, and stabilizing 
commercial transport demand as consumption overtakes fixed asset investment as an important 
driver of economic growth. The coal share, by contrast, drops dramatically, from 70% in 2010 to 
around 28% by 2050. Coal demand in 2050 is 23% lower than 2010, after reaching a peak in 
2020 at 84 EJ. Coal is the least expensive fuel to displace, given the wide range of substitutes for 
its various uses—including wind, solar, nuclear, and hydro in the power sector, natural gas in 
district heating systems, and natural gas or biomass in direct industrial uses. The use of 
petroleum-based liquid fuels in transportation, on the other hand, has fewer (and currently, only 
more expensive) substitutes, such as bio-based fuels and electric vehicles. Wind, solar and 
biomass electricity also continue to grow through 2050 in both policy scenarios (Figure 3), with 
the share of total primary energy reaching 10% in 2030 and 17% in 2050 in the AE scenario, 
compared to 7% (2030) and 10% (2050) in the CE scenario. 
Without further policy action, China’s carbon emissions are projected to reach levels that 
threaten any global effort to stabilize climate change (see Figure 2). But with an immediate start 
and long-term targets, China will minimize the impact of emissions control costs on the 
country’s economic development. By 2050, policy cost due to the additional measures rises to 
1.2% of consumption in the CE scenario and to 2.6% of consumption in the AE scenario, relative 
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Figure 3. Deployment of renewable energy in 2030 and 2050 under the No Policy, Continued Effort, and 
Accelerated Effort scenarios. 
to the No Policy scenario. These losses are relatively modest, and will be offset by reductions in 
the environmental and health costs of China’s coal-intensive energy system (which we do not 
quantify here). We also note modest “leakage” of CO2 emissions outside of China in both 
scenarios, as reduced fossil fuel use in China puts downward pressure on prices globally, causing 
modest increases in CO2-intensive fuel demand and associated emissions in other countries. 
Relative to a case that only considers reductions in China, we find that cumulative global CO2 
emissions are +3.3% in the CE scenario and +3.8% in the AE scenario, with most of the increase 
due to higher coal use in the Asian regions outside of China, particularly in emerging Southeast 
Asia. 
Based on our analysis of alternative policy paths in China, we find that a modest CO2 price 
results in significant emissions reductions. The challenge ahead will be managing the transition 
to a slower growth path (anticipated in all three scenarios) and creating incentives to reduce 
system-wide inefficiencies in resource allocation within China’s economy, while appropriately 
and efficiently pricing the societal costs of energy use—all goals reaffirmed at China’s Third 
Plenum. If the pledges of the Third Plenum are effectively implemented, China will have a 
strong domestic policy foundation to underpin its post-2020 contribution to mitigating global 
climate change.  
3. METHODS 
For this analysis, we use the China-in-Global Energy Model, a multi-regional simulation 
model of the global energy and economic system. The C-GEM is an empirically-calibrated 
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global energy-economic simulation model that is capable of capturing the impact of policy 
through its effect on the relative prices of energy and other goods, which in turn affects fuel and 
technology choices, the composition of domestic economic activity, and global trade dynamics. 
Developed collaboratively over the past three years by researchers at Tsinghua University and 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as part of the China Energy and Climate Project, the 
C-GEM is constructed using methods well-established in the energy systems and economic 
modeling literatures. However, the C-GEM differs from other models in that it reflects China’s 
domestic economic and energy system data and trends, as well as China-specific cost estimates 
for advanced energy technologies (see Appendix Section A1). The C-GEM is calibrated using 
energy and economic data from global and domestic Chinese data sets for the model base year, 
2007, and the first simulated period, 2010. The basic structure of the model reflects the circular 
flow of the economy in which households supply factor inputs (labor and capital) to production 
sectors, which are combined with energy and intermediate inputs to produce final goods and 
services purchased by households. The model is formulated as a mixed complementarity 
problem (MCP) (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995) in the Mathematical Programming System 
for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) (Rutherford, 1999) and the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS) modeling language (Rosenthal, 2012). The system of equations is solved using 
the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) to determine prices and quantities of all factors of 
production (labor, capital, resources) as well as goods and services produced by represented 
economic sectors.  
In the C-GEM, policy acts primarily through changes in the relative prices of goods as 
economic activities adjust to reflect a new equilibrium that meets all policy constraints at least 
cost. Energy policies that can be represented in a CGE framework range from market-based 
instruments such as a carbon charge or tax on fuels to command-and-control policies that directly 
constrain the quantity or efficiency of energy use, or require the application of specific energy 
technologies. Examples of policy modeling efforts employing CGE models with structural 
similarities to C-GEM—used independently or in connection with natural systems models in 
integrated assessment studies—are numerous (Babiker et al., 2003; Babiker et al., 2004; 
Böhringer and Löschel, 2006; Melillo et al., 2009; Böhringer et al., 2012).  
The C-GEM model has been applied in previous peer-reviewed studies, including Qi et al. 
(2014b, 2014c). Further information is available in the Appendix (Section A1) as well as the 
model documentation (Qi et al., 2014a). 
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This appendix provides additional supporting documentation and sensitivity analysis related 
to the analysis described in the main text. Specifically, we include a detailed and transparent 
description of the model structure and parameter assumptions. We also test the sensitivity of 
model outcomes to several key parameters. Recognizing the inherent uncertainty in forecasting 
complex systems over long time scales, our goal in this work is to develop projections that allow 
readers to understand the relationship between incentives created by newly announced policies 
and future energy and CO2 emissions trends in China. 
A1. MODEL STRUCTURE AND DISTINCTIVE FEATURES  
The structure of the C-GEM is similar to other recursive-dynamic global computable general 
equilibrium models with a detailed representation of the energy system, such as the Applied 
Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy (ADAGE) Model (Ross, 2008), Policy Analysis based 
on Computable Equilibrium (PACE) (Böhringer et al., 2004), Global Trade and Environment 
Model (GTEM) (Pant, 2007), GTAP in GAMS (Rutherford, 2005), and the MIT Emissions 
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005). Among these models, the 
C-GEM’s closest relative is the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, 
which has been used to analyze the evolution of the global energy and economic system and the 
impact of energy and climate policy. Previous assessments using the MIT EPPA model have 
focused largely on the United States and Europe, although several studies have focused on China 
(Paltsev et al., 2012; Nam et al., 2013). The C-GEM differs from the EPPA (Version 5) model in 
terms of the model base year, the data used for China, and the representation of trends in 
economic growth, the savings rate, and technology costs in China. The C-GEM was constructed 
using the eighth release of the Global Trade Analysis Project data set (GTAP8) (Narayanan 
et al., 2012). In the C-GEM, data for the China region in GTAP8 are replaced with China’s 
officially-released national input-output tables (NBS, 2009). Production sectors in the C-GEM 
model are described in Table A1. Countries and regional aggregates included in the C-GEM 
model are described in Table A2.  
                                                
1 This is an appendix to Zhang et al. (2014): Carbon emissions in China: How far can new efforts bend the 
curve? MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Report 267 
(http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt267.pdf). 
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Table A1. Production sectors included in the C-GEM. 
Type Sector Description 
Agriculture 
CROP Crops Food and non-food crops produced on managed cropland 
FORS Forest Managed forest land and logging activities 
LIVE Livestock Animal husbandry and animal products 
Energy 
COAL Coal Mining and agglomeration of hard coal, lignite and peat 
OIL Oil Extraction of petroleum 
GAS Gas Extraction of natural gas 
ROIL Petroleum Refined oil and petro chemistry products 
ELEC Electricity Electricity and heat generation, transmission and distribution 
Energy-
Intensive 
Industry 
NMM Non-Metallic 
Minerals Products 
Cement, plaster, lime, gravel and concrete 
I&S Iron & Steel Manufacture and casting of iron and steel 
NFM Non-Ferrous 
Metals Products 
Production and casting of copper, aluminum, zinc, lead,  
gold and silver 
CRP Chemical 
Rubber Products 
Basic chemicals, other chemical products, rubber and 
plastics 
FMP Fabricated 
Metal Products 
Sheet metal products (except machinery and equipment) 
Other 
production 
FOOD Food & Tobacco Manufacture of food products and tobacco 
MINE Mining Mining of metal ores, uranium, gems and other 
mining/quarrying 
CNS Construction Construction of houses, factories, offices and roads 
EQUT Equipment Machinery and equipment, including electronic equipment 
OTHR Other Industries Other industries 
Service 
TRAN Transportation 
Services 
Pipeline transport, and water, air and land transport 
(passenger and freight) 
SERV Other Service Communication, finance, public services, dwellings and 
other services 
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Table A2. Regional aggregation in the C-GEM. 
C-GEM Regional aggregation Countries and regions included 
Developed Economies  
United States (USA) United States of America 
Canada (CAN) Canada 
Japan (JPN) Japan 
South Korea (KOR) South Korea 
Developed Asia (DEA) Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore 
Europe Union (EUR) Includes EU-27 plus countries in the European Free Trade Area (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland) 
Australia-New Zealand (ANZ) Australia, New Zealand, and other territories (Antarctica, Bouvet Island, British Indian Ocean Territory, French Southern Territories) 
Developing and Undeveloped Economies 
China (CHN) Mainland China 
India (IND) India 
Developing South-East Asia (SEA) Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Southeast Asian countries not classified elsewhere 
Rest of Asia (ROA) Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Mongolia and Asian countries not classified elsewhere 
Mexico (MEX) Mexico 
Middle East (MES) Iran, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia  
South Africa (ZAF) South Africa 
Rest of Africa (AFR) African countries not classified elsewhere 
Russia (RUS) Russia  
Rest of Eurasia (ROE) 
Albania, Croatia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, European countries not classified 
elsewhere 
Brazil (BRA) Brazil 
Latin America (LAM) Latin American countries not classified elsewhere 
Given the large number of modeling studies conducted for China, it is worth emphasizing 
why our modeling framework is at once methodologically rigorous, uniquely representative of 
current reality in China, and well suited for studying long-term energy system evolution and the 
impacts of policy. First, we choose a modeling approach that accounts for interdependencies 
among economic sectors by capturing how changes in input costs affect the prices of final goods 
and services consumed across the economy. Representing these interdependencies is particularly 
important because fossil energy types are inputs to a broad range of productive activities. 
Projecting how policy-induced changes in the cost of fossil energy affect final demand would be 
impossible without an economy-wide, multi-sector model. Moreover, our model endogenously 
captures how producers and consumers reduce demand or shift the composition of production or 
consumption in response to changes in relative prices. An economy-wide model built on 
microeconomic foundations also allows us to evaluate the aggregate cost of policy.  
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Second, our model is calibrated based on the latest available data and expectations about 
China’s energy system, economic activity, and growth trends. We use national data (rather than 
provincial or other more disaggregated data) to calibrate the model. While discrepancies between 
national energy and emissions totals and national totals based on provincially-reported data are 
well documented (Guan et al., 2012), we choose to use the national totals, as they are widely 
considered less susceptible to inconsistencies and over-reporting of economic output compared 
to China’s regional data. National totals are also used in the formulation of China’s national 
climate policy.  
Third, our model introduces many relevant trends specific to China’s economy and stage of 
development, including a reduction in the savings rate over time (discussed in Section A2.1) as 
well as technology costs that reflect available estimates and expectations (Section A2.2). As 
such, the C-GEM baseline (No Policy) projection provides a counterfactual scenario against 
which we evaluate the impact of China’s post-2020 energy and climate policy proposals. 
A2. ASSUMPTIONS 
A2.1 Economy 
To develop our No Policy counterfactual scenario, we calibrate an economic growth path 
driven by changes in the labor productivity growth rate and a process of capital accumulation. 
For all countries except for China, the depreciation rate is assumed to be 5%, while in China we 
assume that the depreciation rate converges linearly from about 12% in 2010 (following Bai 
et al., 2006) to 6% in 2050. The savings rate convergence path follows OECD analysis (OECD, 
2012), reflecting the intuition that China’s (currently high) savings rate will fall over time and 
the share of consumption in total national income will increase as shown in Table A3. The 
impact of this assumption is discussed in Section A4.  
Table A3. Relative shares of consumption and investment in total national income. 
 Consumption Investment 
2010 0.520 0.480 
2015 0.535 0.465 
2020 0.570 0.430 
2025 0.610 0.390 
2030 0.640 0.360 
2035 0.670 0.330 
2040 0.700 0.300 
2045 0.700 0.300 
2050 0.700 0.300 
 
A2.2 Technology Costs and Improvement Rates 
A central modeling assumption is the long-run rate of efficiency improvement attributable to 
technological change and capital stock turnover. We assume an energy efficiency improvement 
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rate of 1.7% per year in China, which is applied to all production sectors and household final 
demand. To avoid double counting, we do not apply the rate in the electric power sector; this 
also reflects the fact that by 2010, electric power generation efficiency reflected significant new 
capacity operating near global frontier efficiency levels, as most of the less efficient, outdated 
capacity had been phased out during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. We consider sensitivity to this 
assumption by considering three alternative (lower) assumptions for the rate of energy efficiency 
improvement as follows: 1) 0% per year for the household sector only, 2) 1% per year for all 
production sectors (not including the household sector), and 3) the combined effect of a 0% per 
year for the household sector and 1% per year for all production sectors. 
Assumptions in the C-GEM for the cost of advanced technologies (expressed as a mark-up 
relative to the price of pulverized coal technology in 2010) reflect the latest available data and 
views based on expert elicitation conducted in China. We provide our assumptions for the 
relative cost of each advanced technology in Table A4 below. 
Table A4. Relative prices of advanced electric power generation technologies assumed for this study 
(cost of pulverized coal generation is normalized to 1.0). 
Year Markup relative to pulverized coal generation1 
 Wind2 Solar PV3 Bioelectricity4 Natural gas w/carbon capture and storage5 
Integrated gasification  
combined cycle6 
2010 1.3 2.5 1.8 2.35 1.55 
2015 1.3 2.0 1.8 2.35 1.55 
2020–2050 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.35 1.55 
1Note: The base cost of conventional power generation is assumed to be 0.4 yuan/KWh, the national 
average cost for producing coal-fired electricity in 2010.  
2Wind power costs are based on expert elicitation and refer to average wind electricity production 
costs (0.5–0.55 yuan/KWh).  
3Solar PV costs in 2010 (1.0–1.15 yuan/KWh) are based on estimates from NDRC (NDRC, 2011). 
These costs decrease in 2015 (to 0.8 yuan/KWh) and again in 2020 (0.6 yuan/kWh). These 
reductions are based on the cost reduction targets issued by the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT, 2012). 
4Biomass power costs (0.7 yuan/KWh) are based on expert elicitation.  
5NGCC-CCS costs (0.94 yuan/KWh) are based on literature estimates (Rubin and de Coninck, 2005) 
and expert elicitation. 
6IGCC-CCS costs (0.65 yuan/KWh) are based on literature estimates (Rubin and de Coninck, 2005) 
and expert elicitation. 
A2.3 Policy Description and Modeling Approach 
The two policy scenarios modeled in this analysis, Continued Effort and Accelerated Effort, 
are described in Table 1 in the main text. China achieved a carbon intensity reduction of 21% 
over the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2005–2010), and targets a further reduction of 17% over the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). As a result, if China can achieve a carbon intensity reduction 
of 3% per year over the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), it can accomplish a carbon 
intensity reduction of approximately 44% from 2005 to 2020, well within the range of its 
Copenhagen carbon intensity reduction pledge. We assume that China will maintain its 
Copenhagen pledge momentum, and achieve a carbon intensity reduction rate of approximately 3% 
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per year from 2016 through 2050 in the Continued Effort scenario. We choose a carbon price 
instrument to enforce the carbon intensity target, acknowledging that China has exhausted much of 
the abatement achieved through updating outdated equipment and introducing market-based 
economic reforms. Further rationale for our policy representation is that China has begun piloting 
emissions trading systems in seven cities and provinces in order to support achievement of the 
carbon intensity targets included in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In the Accelerated Effort scenario, 
we implement a higher carbon tax at the level needed to achieve a steeper decline in CO2 intensity 
(approximately 4% per year). Through a fossil resource tax as well as support for renewable energy 
(through a feed-in tariff for wind, solar, and biomass), hydro-electric power, and nuclear power, 
the Continued Effort scenario assumes that existing targets will be achieved and extended. On the 
other hand, in the Accelerated Effort scenario we assume that technical and non-technical (e.g. 
regulatory) barriers to renewable expansion are lower, reducing the cost associated with integrating 
intermittent renewables, and so the same feed-in tariff results in a higher level of adoption; 
hydro-electric power development according to existing plans, given that available resources are 
expected to be maximized; and nuclear power resource expansion from 350 GW to 450 GW, 
representing a more aggressive assumption about long-term available nuclear power potential. 
Carbon taxes and fossil resource taxes are either modeled as a percentage of the underlying 
price or computed on a mass basis, as described above. Taxes introduce a wedge between the 
production cost and consumer price, with all tax revenue paid to a central planner and rebated 
lump-sum to households. All resources taxes are applied as an output tax at the point of production, 
following current practice in China. Resource taxes for oil and natural gas are set at 5% of output 
value, while coal is taxed on a mass basis at the rate of 4 CNY/ton (a very small percentage of 
current output value, <5%) (State Council, 2011). Policymakers are currently discussing whether 
or not to tax coal based on output value or quantity. Thus we simulate a transition to a coal 
resource tax of 10% by value in the AE scenario. The tax on crude oil and natural gas is also higher 
in the AE scenario, although we assume it is not taxed at the same level as coal, given the larger 
associated environmental damages. 
Hydro and nuclear resource availability is modeled following representation in the MIT 
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005). We model 
economically-available resource as a function of central plans to exploit these two energy types, 
given that development is highly policy-driven (due to conservation objectives, safety concerns 
associated with rapid deployment, and other reasons). 
The feed-in tariff for wind, solar, and biomass electricity is modeled as a surcharge on the 
electricity price to consumers, reflecting current practice in China (SCNPC, 2006). The 
surcharge on output of the three generation types is set endogenously to a level that results in the 
corresponding targeted increase in the price of electricity equivalent to the assumed FIT level 
(the current FIT level in 2013 for wind is 0.51–0.61 CNY/KWh (NDRC, 2009), 0.90–1.00 
CNY/KWh for solar (NDRC, 2013), and 0.75 CNY/KWh for biomass power (NDRC, 2010)).  
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A3. MODEL OUTPUTS 
Below are detailed tables (Tables A5, A6 and A7) of model outputs for a set of 
economy-wide indicators, the primary energy mix, CO2 emissions, and prices for the three main 
scenarios (and in Section A4, several sensitivity cases). 
Table A5. Key outputs and indicators in the No Policy (NP) scenario. 
Economy-wide indicators 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Population (millions) 1336 1369 1391 1402 1409 1414 1403 1387 1373 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6699 9395 12198 15227 18350 21819 25553 29651 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.4% 7.0% 5.4% 4.5% 3.8% 3.5% 3.2% 3.0% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3149 4788 6679 8779 11090 13807 16175 18782 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.43 1.30 1.19 1.08 0.98 0.89 0.80 0.71 
CO2-intensity change 
%/year   --- -1.9% -1.8% -1.8% -1.9% -2.0% -2.0% -2.1% -2.3%           
Primary energy use (EJ)   
Coal 68.3  88.5  113.4  134.2  152.5  165.8  177.4  185.0  189.0  
Oil 17.1  22.2  28.4  33.4  37.6  41.1  44.6  47.3  49.9  
Natural gas 3.5  4.7  6.5  8.4  10.4  12.5  15.0  17.8  21.2  
Nuclear 0.8  2.9  4.2  5.7  7.1  8.3  8.9  9.4  10.2  
Hydro 6.3  8.2  11.0  11.0  11.2  11.2  11.4  11.3  11.6  
Wind 1.1  1.3  1.6  2.0  2.4  2.8  3.4  3.8  4.3  
Solar 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  
Bio-electricity 0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  
Bio-oil 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  
Total 97.4 128.3 165.4 195.1 221.8 242.4 261.4 275.4 287.1 
          
China Emissions 
CO2 (mmt) 7382 9561 12249 14511 16491 18000 19370 20359 21057 
Prices (Normalized to 2007 price level) 
Coal 1.02 1.09 1.16 1.22 1.29 1.36 1.44 1.53 1.64 
Oil 1.00 1.16 1.32 1.48 1.64 1.78 1.91 2.03 2.14 
Natural gas 1.03 1.10 1.15 1.19 1.22 1.26 1.29 1.34 1.38 
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Table A6. Key outputs and indicators in the Continued Effort (CE) scenario. 
Economy-wide indicators 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Population (millions) 1336 1369 1391 1402 1409 1414 1403 1387 1373 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6739 9359 12115 15095 18137 21522 25158 29157 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.5% 6.8% 5.3% 4.5% 3.7% 3.5% 3.2% 3.0% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3172 4774 6650 8730 11000 13672 15991 18549 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton  $7  $14  $19  $26  $33  $41  $50  $58  
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.31 1.10 0.93 0.78 0.66 0.56 0.48 0.41 
CO2-intensity change 
%/year   --- -3.7% -3.4% -3.3% -3.4% -3.2% -3.2% -3.1% -3.0%           
Primary energy use (EJ)   
Coal 68.3  79.6  90.4  96.2  97.8  96.0  92.5  88.6  84.7  
Oil 17.1  21.7  27.1  31.5  35.1  38.1  40.9  43.0  45.0  
Natural gas 3.5  5.7  8.8  11.6  15.0  18.6  22.9  26.5  29.9  
Nuclear 0.8  2.9  4.2  8.5  12.8  16.0  18.7  21.0  23.5  
Hydro 6.3  8.2  11.0  11.0  11.2  11.2  11.4  11.3  11.6  
Wind 1.1  1.8  3.7  6.0  7.5  8.6  9.9  10.7  11.4  
Solar 0.0  0.3  1.1  2.0  3.0  4.1  5.2  5.9  6.6  
Bio-electricity 0.2  0.7  1.4  1.7  2.1  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.7  
Bio-oil 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Total 97.4 121.1 147.8 168.7 184.8 195.0 204.2 209.9 215.8 
          
China Emissions 
CO2 (mmt) 7382 8803 10269 11216 11774 12000 12102 12084 12046 
Prices (Normalized to 2007 price level) 
Coal 1.02 1.07 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.11 
Oil 1.00 1.16 1.31 1.46 1.61 1.75 1.87 1.99 2.10 
Natural gas 1.03 1.14 1.21 1.27 1.33 1.39 1.45 1.51 1.57 
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Table A7. Key outputs and indicators in the Accelerated Effort (AE) scenario. 
Economy-wide indicators 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Population (millions) 1336 1369 1391 1402 1409 1414 1403 1387 1373 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6766 9349 12069 15028 18055 21377 24899 28726 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.6% 6.7% 5.2% 4.5% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3187 4771 6632 8702 10963 13594 15844 18299 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton  $9  $20  $29  $38  $49  $64  $85  $115  
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.28 1.04 0.84 0.68 0.55 0.44 0.36 0.30 
CO2-intensity change 
%/year   --- -4.0% -4.1% -4.3% -4.1% -4.1% -4.0% -3.9% -3.9%           
Primary energy use (EJ)   
Coal 68.3  78.1  84.2  82.9  79.4  72.3  64.4  57.4  52.3  
Oil 17.1  21.6  26.6  30.6  34.0  36.6  38.8  39.9  40.1  
Natural gas 3.5  5.8  9.6  13.2  16.5  19.8  23.1  24.8  23.7  
Nuclear 0.8  2.9  4.2  10.0  15.6  20.1  24.3  27.1  30.3  
Hydro 6.3  8.2  11.0  11.0  11.2  11.2  11.4  11.3  11.6  
Wind 1.1  1.8  3.7  6.8  10.4  12.9  15.2  16.3  17.8  
Solar 0.0  0.3  1.1  2.3  4.3  6.4  8.2  9.1  10.0  
Bio-electricity 0.2  0.7  1.4  2.2  2.8  3.2  3.6  3.8  4.0  
Bio-oil 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  
Total 97.4 119.7 142.0 159.1 174.4 182.7 189.2 190.1 190.1 
          
China Emissions 
CO2 (mmt) 7382 8674 9738 10072 10158 9875 9497 9049 8565 
Prices (Normalized to 2007 price level) 
Coal 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.02 0.99 0.98 0.98 
Oil 1.00 1.15 1.30 1.45 1.60 1.74 1.85 1.97 2.07 
Natural gas 1.03 1.14 1.24 1.30 1.36 1.42 1.49 1.56 1.63 
Abbreviations: N.A. – Not applicable (e.g. no carbon price), mmt – million metric tons, EJ –Exajoule. 
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A4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
We further investigate the effect of changing assumptions used in our modeling analysis on 
outcomes of interest, focusing on economy-wide indicators. Table A8 shows the results for all 
three scenarios assuming that no economic structural change occurs (e.g. the 2010 structure of 
GDP, 52% consumption and 48% investment, is preserved). Without structural change, we find 
that in the year 2050, GDP is higher by 13% and primary energy use is higher by 10%. 
Table A9 shows the impact of making carbon capture and storage (CCS) available in each of 
the policy scenarios. CCS provides an important and cost-effective substitute for conventional 
power as the carbon price increases, becoming economically viable in 2040 (CE scenario) and in 
2035 (AE scenario), respectively. CCS makes an increasing contribution to abatement as the 
price of carbon increases, with a projected 1793 mmt of CO2 reduced through CCS in the AE 
scenario relative to baseline in 2050, or 14% of total abatement in that year (measured relative to 
2050 projections for the No Policy case). 
Table A10 shows the impact of assuming slower energy efficiency improvement, taking the 
No Policy case as an example. If instead of improving at 1.7% per year, household energy 
efficiency were to remain stable over time, total CO2 emissions in China would be about 12% 
higher in 2050. Meanwhile, if industrial energy efficiency were to improve at a rate of 1% per 
year rather than 1.7% per year, by 2050 total CO2 emissions in China would be about 20% 
higher. The combined effect of assuming a lower rate of efficiency improvement in both the 
residential and industrial sectors is an increase in China’s total CO2 emissions by about 31% in 
2050. 
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Table A8. Scenario results with no shift from investment to consumption on energy use and CO2 emissions. 
No Policy 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6700 9489 12592 16129 19872 24161 28793 33529 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.4% 7.2% 5.8% 5.1% 4.3% 4.0% 3.6% 3.1% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3061 4414 5888 7571 9336 11375 13564 15787 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.43 1.31 1.20 1.09 0.98 0.88 0.79 0.69 
CO2-intensity change  
%/year   --- -1.9% -1.7% -1.8% -1.9% -2.0% -2.1% -2.3% -2.5% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 97.4 128.4 167.4 201.8 234.7 260.9 285.7 304.3 315.9 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7382 9573 12419 15069 17553 19511 21313 22608 23215 
China CO2 change (mmt) 0 12 170 558 1062 1510 1943 2249 2157 
Current Effort 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6741 9450 12494 15967 19607 23790 28307 32948 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.5% 7.0% 5.7% 5.0% 4.2% 3.9% 3.5% 3.1% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3084 4401 5857 7519 9244 11245 13392 15584 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton   --- $7 $14 $19 $26 $33 $41 $50 $58 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.31 1.10 0.94 0.79 0.68 0.58 0.49 0.43 
CO2-intensity change  
%/year   --- -3.6% -3.4% -3.2% -3.3% -3.2% -3.1% -3.0% -3.0% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 97.4 121.1 149.4 174.2 195.4 210.2 224.2 234.0 240.8 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7382 8813 10412 11691 12663 13248 13727 13994 13999 
China CO2 change (mmt) 0 10 143 475 889 1248 1625 1910 1953 
Accelerated Effort 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6768 9441 12446 15893 19513 23616 27987 32403 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.6% 6.9% 5.7% 5.0% 4.2% 3.9% 3.5% 3.0% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3098 4398 5839 7493 9211 11174 13255 15349 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton   --- $9 $20 $29 $38 $49 $64 $85 $115 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.29 1.05 0.85 0.70 0.57 0.47 0.38 0.31 
CO2-intensity change  
%/year   --- -4.0% -4.0% -4.1% -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% -3.9% -4.0% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 97.4 119.9 143.7 164.7 184.9 197.4 207.8 211.1 210.2 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7382 8702 9895 10571 11049 11106 11027 10702 10080 
China CO2 change (mmt) 0 28 157 499 891 1231 1530 1653 1515 
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Table A9. The impact of carbon capture and storage (CCS) availability. 
No Policy 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6699 9395 12198 15227 18350 21819 25553 29651 
GDP growth per year   --- 7.4% 7.0% 5.4% 4.5% 3.8% 3.5% 3.2% 3.0% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3149 4788 6679 8779 11090 13807 16175 18782 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.43 1.30 1.19 1.08 0.98 0.89 0.80 0.71 
CO2-intensity change per year   --- -1.9% -1.8% -1.8% -1.9% -2.0% -2.0% -2.1% -2.3% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 97.4 128.3 165.4 195.1 221.8 242.4 261.4 275.4 287.1 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7382 9561 12249 14511 16491 18000 19368 20357 21054 
China CO2 change (mmt) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCS % share of coal generation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Current Effort 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6739 9359 12115 15095 18137 21524 25178 29203 
GDP growth per year   --- 7.5% 6.8% 5.3% 4.5% 3.7% 3.5% 3.2% 3.0% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3172 4774 6650 8730 11000 13673 16004 18575 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton   --- $7  $14  $19  $26  $33  $40  $48  $54  
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.31 1.10 0.93 0.78 0.66 0.56 0.48 0.41 
CO2-intensity change per year   --- -3.7% -3.4% -3.3% -3.4% -3.2% -3.2% -3.1% -3.0% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 97.4 121.1 147.8 168.7 184.8 195.0 205.0 211.8 220.1 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7382 8803 10269 11216 11774 12000 12106 12084 12046 
China CO2 change (mmt) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCS % share of coal generation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 5% 13% 
Accelerated Effort 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4690 6766 9349 12069 15028 18059 21410 24981 28934 
GDP growth per year   --- 7.6% 6.7% 5.2% 4.5% 3.7% 3.5% 3.1% 3.0% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2066 3187 4771 6632 8702 10965 13615 15893 18424 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton   --- $9  $20  $29  $38  $48  $61  $77  $93  
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.57 1.28 1.04 0.84 0.68 0.55 0.44 0.36 0.30 
CO2-intensity change per year   --- -4.0% -4.1% -4.3% -4.1% -4.1% -4.1% -4.0% -4.0% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 97.4 119.7 142.0 159.1 174.4 183.9 191.8 196.6 205.9 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7382 8674 9738 10072 10158 9881 9497 9049 8565 
China CO2 change (mmt) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCS % share of coal generation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 14% 46% 91% 
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Table A10. The impact of reducing the household and industrial energy efficiency improvement rate in the 
reference (No Policy) case. 
Household low efficiency only 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4683 6668 9320 12051 14977 17961 21242 24757 28592 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.3% 6.9% 5.3% 4.4% 3.7% 3.4% 3.1% 2.9% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2063 3135 4752 6606 8649 10877 13476 15718 18173 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.59 1.46 1.36 1.27 1.18 1.09 1.01 0.92 0.83 
CO2-intensity change  
%/year   --- -1.6% -1.4% -1.4% -1.5% -1.5% -1.6% -1.8% -2.0% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 98.1 130.7 170.7 204.4 235.8 261.9 287.3 306.7 323.8 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7439 9758 12679 15254 17603 19525 21348 22683 23683 
China CO2 change (mmt) 58 197 430 743 1112 1525 1979 2323 2626 
Industry low efficiency only 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4686 6681 9348 12101 15057 18083 21427 24996 28883 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.4% 6.9% 5.3% 4.5% 3.7% 3.5% 3.1% 2.9% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2064 3140 4762 6623 8676 10921 13549 15810 18278 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.63 1.52 1.43 1.34 1.25 1.15 1.06 0.97 0.88 
CO2-intensity change  
%/year   --- -1.4% -1.2% -1.3% -1.4% -1.5% -1.6% -1.8% -2.0% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 100.4 135.4 178.6 215.3 249.6 278.0 304.8 326.4 345.1 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7624 10146 13332 16157 18749 20857 22799 24296 25362 
China CO2 change (mmt) 242 585 1083 1646 2258 2857 3429 3936 4305 
Combined household and 
industry low efficiency 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP  
USD 2007 bil 4679 6650 9272 11952 14802 17684 20833 24173 27780 
GDP growth  
%/year   --- 7.3% 6.9% 5.2% 4.4% 3.6% 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 
Consumption  
USD 2007 bil 2060 3126 4726 6549 8543 10703 13208 15336 17643 
CO2-price  
2007 USD/ton N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CO2-intensity  
mmt CO2/bil 2007 USD 1.64 1.56 1.48 1.41 1.34 1.26 1.18 1.09 0.99 
CO2-intensity change  
%/year   --- -1.1% -0.9% -1.0% -1.1% -1.2% -1.3% -1.6% -1.9% 
Primary energy use (EJ) 101.0 137.7 183.8 224.2 263.0 296.3 328.6 354.4 377.1 
China CO2 emissions (mmt) 7681 10340 13751 16870 19796 22258 24562 26283 27491 
China CO2 change (mmt) 299 779 1502 2359 3305 4258 5192 5924 6434 
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